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MANIPULATION OF THE CHINESE YUAN – MAY WTO MEMBERS 
RESPOND?  
 
 Ioana Ciobănaşu & Erik Denters* 
 
Abstract 
China has been accused of intentionally undervaluing its currency to gain a 
competitive trading advantage. The June 2007 Decision of the International Monetary 
Fund expressly authorizes the Fund to determine whether a country is manipulating 
the exchange rate of its currency. If the IMF makes a determination, the manipulating 
member violates its obligations under the IMF Articles. It is argued that this 
determination could also have legal repercussions under Article XV of GATT (General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), prohibiting World Trade Organisation members to 
frustrate GATT provisions through ‘exchange action’. The question is raised whether 
aggrieved members may take this matter to the dispute settlement body provided by the 
WTO system.  
 
Introduction 
 
A remarkable feature of the current global economy is a significant imbalance in trade 
flows between the world’s economies. Major current account deficits and surpluses 
result in a major absorption of the savings of one nation by another. In case of the 
United States the numbers are staggering. With over $800 billion the US has the 
largest current account deficit ever, making the world’s largest economy also the 
largest debtor.  
 
Where there is a deficit, there must be a surplus somewhere else. The international 
financial crisis in the late 1990s prompted many emerging economies to fix and 
manage their exchange rates in order to accumulate large foreign reserves and run 
current-account surpluses that would provide them the most desired external stability. 
Their competitiveness would be secured through currency depreciation and rapid 
productivity gains. The surplus is a feature of many Asian countries and other 
emerging and oil-rich economies. China has become the largest surplus country in the 
world. Its trade surplus soared to over $250 billion in 20071 and the accumulation of 
foreign reserves is well known of passing the psychological threshold of $1,5 trillion. 
 
Why is there a concern if these countries are doing so well? As most economists agree, 
the actual situation is unsustainable in both international financial and domestic 
political (i.e. trade policy) terms.2 In a regime of fixed exchange rates, there is always 
a risk of 
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“[…] loss of domestic monetary control and the difficulty of maintaining monetary 
policy in response to domestic conditions. One sees this very clearly, particularly in 
the Chinese case where the external constraints exert an important impact on domestic 
monetary policy. It is noteworthy that much of the speculative bubble in Japan during 
the late 1980s that had such a catastrophic long run impact on the Japanese economy 
was driven by liquidity produced by a desire to avoid excessive yen appreciation. 
Fixed exchange rates with heavy intervention have enormous capacity to create an 
illusory sense of stability that could be shattered very quickly. That is the lesson of 
Britain in 1992, of Mexico in 1994, of emerging Asia in 1997, of Russia in 1998, and 
of Brazil in 1998”.3  
 
Managed depreciation of a currency in a surplus country creates inflationary pressure 
and thus hinders global adjustment. The burden of adjustment will shift unevenly onto 
the countries with a flexible regime of exchange rates.  
 
What is to be done? Last year in spring, during the International Monetary Fund’s 
(hereinafter: IMF or the Fund) Multilateral Consultation on global imbalances, the 
IMF gave its advice – reduced fiscal and trade deficits in the US, greater domestic 
demand in China, more flexibility in euro-area economies, greater liberalisation on 
inward investment in Japan, and more domestic investment in Saudi Arabia. China, 
along with the euro-area, Japan, Saudi Arabia and US, announced their plans to solve 
the situation. As the US Treasury's recent semiannual report to the US Congress noted, 
for China these plans are to “rebalance its economy: boosting domestic demand and 
consumption-led growth; reforming its financial system; and achieving greater 
flexibility in its exchange-rate regime. Indeed, rebalancing the pattern of growth is a 
central economic goal of China’s leadership.”4 A substantial increase in the value of 
the Chinese currency is an essential component of reducing the imbalances. The 
external deficits financed through a new renminbi-dollar standard are far larger than 
any deficits associated with the original gold-dollar standard or the original Bretton 
Woods system.5  
 
The collapse of the value of the dollar in the second half of 2007 and, furthermore, its 
rapid depreciation in the final quarter prompted renewed concern about global 
imbalances. These imbalances mean that developing countries, by holding US dollars 
as reserves, are lending money to the US to fuel its current account deficit. That is why 
it is so likely that China’s misalignment will come into focus.6 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Services Committee of the House of Representatives, May 9, 2007 at 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=735#_ftnref2. 
3 L. H. Summers, The U.S. Current Account Deficit and the Global Economy, delivered at The Per Jacobsson 
Foundation, Washington D.C., 2004, at http://www.perjacobsson.org/2004/100304.pdf. 
4 S. Johnson & J. Ostry, The currency traitors on 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2008/02/03/2003400095.  
5 N. Roubini & B. Setser, Will the Bretton Woods 2 Regime Unravel Soon? The Risk of a Hard Landing in 2005-
2006, presented at the Symposium on the “Revived Bretton Woods System: A New Paradigm for Asian 
Development?” organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and UC Berkeley, San Francisco, 4 
February 2005, at http://www.frbsf.org/economics/conferences/0502/Roubini.pdf.  
6 http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art.shtml?x=559969.  
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Discontent over economic behavior of trading partners causes political reactions. 
Industry and labour unions may call for trade measures or insist on other forms of 
economic pressure to bring about a change of policies.7 Politicians may propose 
sanctions and insist that institutions, nationally and internationally, respond. This 
article is an attempt to analyze the legal and institutional framework of the current 
state of affairs. What can be done from within the international institutions that have a 
mandate to deal with global imbalances? Could the IMF or its members respond to 
persistent current accounts deficits or surpluses? Could the WTO members respond 
through its dispute settlement mechanism? These are the questions that we will 
discuss.  
 
We start from the presumption that China is manipulating its currency. This 
presumption must be accompanied with a caveat. We are aware of the difficulty8 of 
assessing “exchange rate misalignment” as “it is subject to significant measurement 
uncertainties. Accordingly, the International Monetary Fund will exercise appropriate 
caution in reaching conclusions about misalignments. Moreover, an exchange rate 
would only be judged to be fundamentally misaligned if the misalignment was 
significant.”9  
 
I. IMF’s New Focus on Manipulated Exchange Rates  
 
I.1. Criticism from US/EU Political Circles Incite IMF Focus 
 
To the US increasingly discontentment over the huge trade deficit with China as a 
consequence of the pegged renminbi,10 add up also the EU’s uneasiness over the 
Chinese policy. That is so not only because of the same trade deficit (or China’s 
surplus), but also because a falling dollar means the euro is taking the brunt of this 
heavily managed yuan.11 This is the paradox: while the Europeans are enduring a trade 
deficit, the Chinese currency has fallen by at least 5 per cent against the euro;12 and 
while the US trade deficit is amounting to over 800bn, the Chinese unit has 
strengthened by just fewer than 10 per cent against the dollar.  
 
All these issues sparked numerous discussions at the official levels, with questions, 
recommendations and solutions offered by the parties involved. It was inevitable for 
the IMF to be asked to deliver its opinion (some would call it “US pressure”). The 
Fund is the global authority to supervise monetary policies of its members. Indeed, a 
                                                 
7 http://www.chinacurrencycoalition.org. 
8 “It is almost impossible to be sure when a currency is misaligned, let alone by how much.” ‘Misleading 
misalignments’, The Economist, June 21, 2007. 
9. http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/surv07.htm. 
10 Although allowed to ‘float’ within limitations since mid-2005. China maintains a crawling peg against a 
basket of currencies. The composition of the basket is not made public.  
11 Yuan and renminbi both refer to the Chinese currency.  
12 China and Europe, Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire, Nov 27th 2007: the euro zone finance ministers 
suggest that the undervaluation of the renminbi against the euro rather than the euro-US dollar or euro-yen rates 
is their biggest concern. In a statement following a meeting on October 8th, they said, “in emerging economies 
with large and growing current-account surpluses, especially China, it is desirable that their effective exchange 
rates move so that necessary adjustments will occur.” 
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purpose of the IMF is the promotion of a stable monetary system and the avoidance of 
competitive depreciation (IMF Articles of Agreement Article I (iii)). Promotion of a 
stable system of exchange rates (“systemic stability”) is also an objective of the 
undertaking of members to collaborate with the Fund (Article IV Section 1). These 
objectives add up to an overarching purpose of the IMF that is “to shorten the duration 
and lessen the degree of disequilibrium in the international balances of payments of 
members” (Article I (vi)).  
 
While these objectives focus on monetary issues, the Fund’s role cannot be considered 
in isolation within the global economy. In international economic relations the stability 
of the monetary system is not an objective per se, but merely a condition for advancing 
prosperity within and among nations. Accordingly, international trade and investments 
will thrive in a system without volatile exchange rate fluctuations and without 
substantial and sustained disparities in balances of payments of countries. Therefore 
the proper role of the IMF is to be subservient to the global trading system.13 It must 
create conditions in which the world’s economy will thrive. Trading nations expect the 
IMF to correct behaviour of countries that undermine such conditions. Article IV 
offers tools to the IMF to address objectionable monetary policies. 
 
I.2. Background of IMF’s Articles of Agreement Article IV 
 
For the promotion of a stable exchange rate system, the Fund Articles of Agreement 
contain ‘Obligations Regarding Exchange Arrangements’ (Article IV). These 
obligations, adopted by amendment in 1978, stipulate that ‘orderly exchange 
arrangements’ are conducive to economic progress and stability of the international 
monetary system. This Article also states in Section 1(iii) that “each member shall 
avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to 
prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive 
advantage over other members”.  
 
Article IV – as it currently applies – was introduced after the breakdown of the so-
called Bretton Woods system of fixed14 but adjustable exchange rates. It allows 
members to depart from the rigidity of the par value system and adopt more flexible 
exchange rates regimes.15 The change caused by the breakdown meant that the 
exchange rate turned into “a variable clearly within the domain of [the member states’] 
their economic policies, either to be used as policy instruments or to be the result of 
policies, or both. Correspondingly, the role of the IMF was changed from that of an 
umpire to an observer.”16 What is important to stress here that since the breakdown 
IMF members may opt for any policy on exchange rates, to the extent that exchange 
                                                 
13 This also follows from the second objective of the IMF: “to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of 
international trade (…)”. 
14 A fixed exchange rate (or fixed peg arrangement) would be the expression of the value of a domestic currency 
in another currency (or gold) at a fixed rate. To maintain the fixed peg it would be necessary for monetary 
authorities to counter market forces and to intervene in the currency markets. 
15 In IMF vocabulary a decision on exchange rate policy is equivalent to ‘exchange rates arrangement’. 
16 K. Subramanian, The IMF’s New Mandate online at 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/2007/10/20/stories/2007102050720800.htm. 
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rates are orderly. Accordingly, there is no prohibition or obligation to adopt fixed 
exchange rate, nor is there a prohibition or obligation to adopt exchange rates that are 
determined by market forces. 
 
The flexibility of the new system was welcomed but some inherent flaws were also 
recognized. Because the new monetary system also allowed for a free floating of 
currencies or any “other exchange arrangement of a member’s choice” it was 
necessary to introduce safeguards against the abuse of the freedom to choose any 
exchange rate regime. One way to prevent abuse was giving the Fund the task to 
exercise ‘firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members’ (Article IV 
Section 3 (b)). Thereby, the IMF could urge members to correct disorderly exchange 
rate policies.  
 
Another safeguard was the obligation to avoid manipulation of the exchange rates, by 
including the clause that “each member shall avoid manipulating exchange rates in 
order to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members” (Article IV, 
Section 1(iii)). This provision holds a duty not to control or influence exchange rates 
with a specific purpose, i.e. to gain an unfair competitive advantage. This provision 
conveys an intentional behaviour (manipulate) of monetary authorities of a country to 
unfairly improve its trading position. Evidence of violation must therefore 
demonstrate: intentional behaviour, unfair competition and advantage. Hitherto, the 
Fund has not endeavoured to demonstrate that a country has manipulated the exchange 
rate of its currency. However, the 2007 Decision on Bilateral Surveillance may arouse 
the Fund’s interest in this matter.  
 
I.3. The June 2007 Decision on Bilateral Surveillance 
 
As explained above, Article IV mandates the Fund’s Executive Board to adopt specific 
principles for the guidance of all members with respect to exchange rate policies.17 It 
has done so in 1977 and has adopted new policies in 2007.18  
 
The new Decision represents a policy framework guiding the IMF’s surveillance over 
member states’ compliance with obligations under Article IV. It is built on the 1977 
Decision on Bilateral Surveillance that already encompassed three principles: 
 
§ The freedom to adjust exchange rates when it was needed in response to 
underlying conditions  
§ The freedom to pursue member’s domestic policies and exchange rate 
necessary for financial stability, and 
§ Members should pursue responsible exchange rate policies and avoid policies to 
interfere with the adjustment process or gain undue advantage over others. 
 
                                                 
17 Art. IV, Section 3(b). 
18 Bilateral Surveillance over Members' Policies Executive Board Decision, June 15, 2007. Public Information 
Notice (PIN) No. 07/69. 
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Interestingly, the 2007 decision adds a fourth principle: “A member should avoid 
exchange rate policies that result in external instability.” 
 
I.3.1. Manipulation of the Exchange Rates – the Core Issue  
 
The 2007 decision maps out principles and procedures and has the purpose of bringing 
greater clarity and specificity to what exchange rate policies countries should follow 
and when the international community has reason to worry. It lays down the rules of 
the game and updates the principles for the guidance of members’ conduct.  
 
Particular importance is given to this new added principle that recommends countries 
to avoid exchange rate policies that cause external instability. The Fund affirms that 
this update was needed as “the most prevalent exchange rate-related problems since 
1977 have been the maintenance, for domestic reasons, of overvalued or undervalued 
exchange rate pegs and, more recently, capital account vulnerabilities often arising 
from balance sheet imbalances”.19 
 
The duty to avoid manipulating exchange rates to gain an unfair competitive advantage 
over other members underlines the need for fairness. A side document of the 2007 
decision20 considers a number of benchmarks for “unfairness”. It concludes that this 
would preferably be related to “deviations in the exchange rate that result in a 
sustained excessive accumulation of net external assets”.21 This means that an 
intentional behaviour of monetary authorities leading to an excessive built up of 
foreign reserves may amount to manipulation. 
 
The 2007 Decision also attaches an annex providing further guidance. It confirms that 
manipulation is a deliberate policy targeted at the exchange rate. The annex urges the 
Fund to make an objective assessment of an ‘unfair competitive advantage’ under two 
conditions: 
  
(a) The member is engaged in [these] policies for the purpose of securing 
fundamental exchange rate misalignment in the form of an undervalued 
exchange rate and  
(b) The purpose of securing such misalignment is to increase net exports. 
 
These elements taken together would enable the Fund’s Executive Board to assess 
when manipulation takes place. What action could the IMF take if it concludes that a 
member has manipulated its exchange rate? The June Decision provides in Part III – 
Procedures for Surveillance – means to monitor the compliance of a member. A 
member that cannot defy the evidence on manipulation will have the duty to bring its 
exchange rate policies in accordance with the obligations of the IMF Articles.22 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Review of the 1977 Decision, Proposal for a New Decision, Companion Paper, Supplement, and Public 
Information Notice, June 21, 2007. 
21 Idem, Companion paper. p.12. 
22 A member that disagrees has no legal means for independent review of the findings of the Fund. It is 
unfortunate that IMF still does not offer a procedure for settling dispute between the Fund and its member, or 
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The added fourth principle could be of particular importance for an aggrieved WTO 
member as it lays down clear-cut obligations with regard to proper and improper 
behaviour in relation to exchange rates. It gives greater certainty to what should be 
expected from any member. A prior IMF assessment labelling any state ‘a 
manipulator’ could much easier trigger a dispute in the WTO as such a behaviour is 
prone to violate the provisions of the GATT or one of the other WTO agreements. And 
even if there would not be a prior IMF finding, a WTO panel may require one.  
 
Could an affected WTO member respond by imposing trade measures following a 
Fund determination that an IMF member is manipulating? Could it turn to the dispute 
settlement mechanism available under the WTO? We will consider these issues below. 
There must be stressed that although this issue is not new, this paper will underline the 
importance and legal implications of the IMF June Decision in case of a potential 
dispute in the World Trade Organisation.  
 
II. The Shift Towards the Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
 
II.1. The Institutional Interface between the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – Speciality Principle and 
Cooperation 
 
The inherent relationship between the WTO and IMF follows from the fact that each 
international trade transaction (WTO jurisdiction) is typically matched by an 
international payment (IMF jurisdiction). There is no trade transaction without 
payment, and no payment without a trade transaction. In a sense trade and payments 
are two sides of one coin and, accordingly, the WTO and the IMF are complementary 
institutions. Whereas the WTO promotes liberalization by the administration of trade 
agreements the IMF paves the way for trade liberalization. It does so by policies 
described above and also by “promoting the removal of restrictions on international 
payments for current transactions”.23 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
between members. Because ‘manipulation’ would mean a violation of the obligation of Article IV Section 1 
paragraph (iii), hypothetical sanctions such as compulsory withdrawal may be applied. We can only speculate 
whether the Fund is willing to take such drastic steps. Under Article XXVI sanction are available in the shao of 
compulsory withdrawal: 
“(a) If a member fails to fulfil any of its obligations under this Agreement, the Fund may declare the member 
ineligible to use the general resources of the Fund. Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to limit the 
provisions of Article V, Section 5 or Article VI, Section 1.  
(b) If, after the expiration of a reasonable period following a declaration of ineligibility under (a) above, the 
member persists in its failure to fulfil any of its obligations under this Agreement, the Fund may, by a seventy 
percent majority of the total voting power, suspend the voting rights of the member. During the period of the 
suspension, the provisions of Schedule L shall apply. The Fund may, by a seventy percent majority of the total 
voting power, terminate the suspension at any time. 
(c) If, after the expiration of a reasonable period following a decision of suspension under (b) above, the member 
persists in its failure to fulfil any of its obligations under this Agreement, that member may be required to 
withdraw from membership in the Fund by a decision of the Board of Governors carried by a majority of the 
Governors having eighty-five percent of the total voting power. (…)” 
23 Payments for current transactions include inter alia ‘all payments due in connection with foreign trade’. 
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The WTO-IMF relationship is also reflected in the institutional arrangements between 
the institutions. GATT Article XV recognizes the significance of IMF’s role in the 
administration of trade relations by calling upon the WTO to consult fully with the 
IMF when considering or dealing with problems concerning monetary reserves, 
balances of payments or foreign exchange arrangements.24 Thereby, Article XV 
attempts to delineate jurisdictions and responsibilities: the WTO is not supposed to 
appraise questions on monetary issues relating to trade.25 We quote Article XV. 
 
The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall seek co-operation with the International Monetary Fund to the 
end that the CONTRACTING PARTIES and the Fund may pursue a co-ordinated policy with regard to 
exchange questions within the jurisdiction of the Fund and questions of quantitative restrictions and 
other trade measures within the jurisdiction of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.  
1. In all cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES are called upon to consider or 
deal with problems concerning monetary reserves, balances of payments or foreign 
exchange arrangements, they shall consult fully with the International Monetary 
Fund. In such consultations, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall accept all findings 
of statistical and other facts presented by the Fund relating to foreign exchange, 
monetary reserves and balances of payments, and shall accept the determination of 
the Fund as to whether action by a contracting party in exchange matters is in 
accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, or 
with the terms of a special exchange agreement between that contracting party and 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES in reaching their final 
decision in cases involving the criteria set forth in paragraph 2 (a) of Article XII or in 
paragraph 9 of Article XVIII, shall accept the determination of the Fund as to what 
constitutes a serious decline in the contracting party’s monetary reserves, a very low 
level of its monetary reserves or a reasonable rate of increase in its monetary 
reserves, and as to the financial aspects of other matters covered in consultation in 
such cases. 
2. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall seek agreement with the Fund regarding 
procedures for consultation under paragraph 2 of this Article.  
3. Contracting parties shall not, by exchange action, frustrate* the intent of the 
provisions of this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the 
Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. 
(…) 
 
9.  Nothing in this Agreement shall preclude: 
a. the use by a contracting party of exchange controls or exchange restrictions 
in accordance with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund or with that contracting party’s special exchange agreement with the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES, or  
b. the use by a contracting party of restrictions or controls in imports or exports, 
the sole effect of which, additional to the effects permitted under Articles XI, 
XII, XIII and XIV, is to make effective such exchange controls or exchange 
restrictions26 
 
                                                 
24 The WTO may want to consult the IMF when a WTO-member imposes trade restrictions because of monetary 
problems. Such action of a WTO-member would be justifiable under the conditions of Art. XII GATT. 
25 Article XV reflects the principle of speciality as elaborated by the ICJ in ‘Legality of the Use by a State of 
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict’. Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Rep. (1996) p. 75. For a comment 
see Peter Bekker in 91 AJIL (1997) 134-138. 
26 GATT 1994 Art. XV (pars. 1-4 & 9) as for interest here. 
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Following an ‘ordinary meaning’ interpretation27 the WTO must consult the IMF on 
monetary matters and shall accept all findings presented by the Fund.28 There appears 
little room for the WTO to do anything else than to listen to the Fund. However, in the 
India – Quantitative Restrictions case the Appellate Body (hereinafter AB) did not 
unequivocally support the indisputability of IMF’s findings.29 It concluded that a 
careful reading of the Panel report makes clear that the Panel did not simply accept the 
views of the IMF but “critically assessed” the data and compared those data with data 
provided by other sources, such as the reports provided by the Bank of India.30 
Thereby the AB hints that there is still some latitude for the WTO to reconsider 
findings of the IMF on monetary affairs. If this suggestion turns out to be the case, 
then there would be a clear deviation from the wording of Article XV. 
 
Article XV reflects the common area in which the WTO and the IMF both operate. 
Trade issues and monetary affairs coalesce. Siegel specifies three categories of 
interaction in the relationship between WTO and IMF:31 
 
§ The first category is WTO obligations and Fund conditionality. This category 
deals with conflicts between obligations arising out of the WTO treaties and 
IMF adjustment programmes. The question whether a WTO-member may 
escape from WTO obligations because of conflicting IMF conditions has been 
dealt with in the Argentine Footwear case.32  
§ The second is the imposition of trade restrictions because of monetary distress. 
In this category the Fund communicates with the WTO on the question whether 
a member has serious deficits in its balance of payments or faces a serious 
decline in its foreign reserves. An ‘emergency response’ would be the 
introduction of import restrictions, prima facie a violation of the WTO 
obligation but justifiable under the conditions of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XII. This was dealt with in India-
Quantitative Restrictions.33 
§ The third category deals with exchange restrictions, i.e. restrictions on the 
making of payments for current transactions. These are payments due in 
connection with foreign trade primarily including good and services. There are 
still a number of developing countries which maintain restrictions on such 
payments and the proper administration by the IMF is of fundamental 
importance for the liberalisation of trade flows.34 
                                                 
27 For the rules on treaty interpretation see Art. 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. 
28 GATT Art. XV and equivalent in GATS Art. XII. 
29 See also D. Siegel, Legal Aspects of IMF/WTO Relationship: The Fund’s Articles Agreement and the WTO 
Agreements, 96 AJIL 3, 561-599. At 583. 
30 AB report, infra note 33, paras. 149-150. 
31 Siegel, p. 572 et seq. 
32 Panel Report, Argentina-Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, 
WT/DS56/R (Nov. 25,1997) (adopted Apr. 22,1998), as modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS56/AB/R & 
Corr.1, DSR 1998: 111, 1033. 
33 Panel Report, India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products, 
WT/DS9O/R (Apr. 6, 1999) (adopted Sept. 22,1999), as modified by Appellate Body 
Report,WT/DS9O/AB/R,AB-1999-3. 
34 This is discussed below. See also fn. 37. 
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We would add a fourth category: exchange rate manipulation resulting in unfair 
competition in trade relations.  
 
II.2. How Would ‘Manipulation’ Feed the WTO? 
 
The current status of the international economic affairs presented at the beginning of 
this paper could trigger an assessment from the IMF with regard to China’s policy on 
exchange rates, i.e. to bluntly dub China a ‘manipulator’. Subsequently, the assessment 
would feed the WTO. Hitherto the Fund resisted United States’ pressure for such a 
determination, although the June Decision seems like tailored for PRC’s exchange rate 
policy. That is also why the decision in question sparked criticism from the People’s 
Bank of China.35 A case of manipulation may end up in a dispute between WTO 
members.  
 
Three scenarios for a dispute may be discerned, regardless of the presence or timing of 
a determination by the Fund of manipulation (if ever): 
 
1. An aggrieved WTO member could file a complaint under the WTO dispute 
settlement procedure. The complainant could build its case around the GATT 
Article XV paragraph 4 and/or  
2. An aggrieved WTO member could file a complaint under the WTO dispute 
settlement procedure based on the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Agreement (SCM). In this scenario there is a presumption that the manipulated 
exchange rate is a de facto export subsidy.  
3. An aggrieved WTO member could impose across-the-board duties on products 
imported from a “manipulating” member. In that case the ‘manipulating’ 
member may assume a cause of action, because of violation of the most 
favoured nation clause (GATT Article I). 
 
 
 
II.2.1. Legal Case I: Article XV paragraph 436 
 
Article XV paragraph 4 may trigger reactions under two conditions. 
1. The manipulation of currency must be an ‘exchange action’ 
2. The manipulation of currency must “frustrate the intent of the provisions of 
GATT”, i.e. trade (this directs one to the GATT Annex I Note Ad paragraph 4). 
The addendum to paragraph 4 specifies that another “specific” provision of the 
                                                 
35 “China has expressed reservations about the adoption of this Decision as it does not fully reflect the 
developing countries' opinions.” 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english//detail.asp?col=6400&ID=849&keyword=bilateral%20surveillance. (visited Feb. 
2008) 
36 It has been asserted by some scholars that an Article XV par. 4 case would have no traction (see Gary C. 
Hufbauer available at http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/3942/02iie3942.pdf. The present 
authors are inclined to assert the opposite as otherwise this provision would be rendered superfluous in its 
totality. 
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GATT must be “frustrated” (which could be e.g. Article XVI); the paragraph 4 
as such has no standing by itself. 
 
What is the meaning of ‘exchange action’ and why was the verb ‘frustrate’ being 
used? The question also arises what should be understood by ‘action’. Does this refer 
to any policy in this field? We hold that action suggests an active policy of a country 
that interferes with the objectives of trade liberalisation.  
 
Exchange action 
Two interpretations of exchange actions are obvious. 
· One is an exchange restriction or exchange control. It is likely that the drafters 
had these in mind, because of the examples mentioned in the addendum to para. 
4. Restrictions may be authorized or unauthorized by the IMF.37 Article XV 
para. 9 (GATT) states that exchange restrictions or controls authorized by the 
IMF are not prohibited under GATT.38  
· Another meaning of exchange action could be the manipulation of an exchange 
rate. Once the IMF finds that manipulation has taken place, the WTO may take 
note of this assessment and may subsequently interpret the manipulation as an 
exchange action under paragraph 4. This could cause further legal action. An 
aggrieved member may find that the manipulation is reason for a complaint 
against the manipulating member. The next step would then be to demonstrate 
that GATT provisions are frustrated because of the manipulation.  
·  
Frustrate 
In an addendum to GATT a clarification on Article XV paragraph 4 is made. 
 
‘The word "frustrate" is intended to indicate, for example,  
 
· That infringements of the letter of any Article of this Agreement by exchange action 
shall not be regarded as a violation of that Article if, in practice, there is no 
appreciable departure from the intent of the Article. Thus, a contracting party which, 
as part of its exchange control operated in accordance with the Articles of Agreement 
of the International Monetary Fund, requires payment to be received for its exports in 
its own currency or in the currency of one or more members of the International 
Monetary Fund will not thereby be deemed to contravene Article XI or Article XIII.  
 
· Another example would be that of a contracting party which specifies on an import 
licence the country from which the goods may be imported, for the purpose not of 
introducing any additional element of discrimination in its import licensing system but 
of enforcing permissible exchange controls.’ 
                                                 
37 These are the “Restrictions on Current Payments”. Cf. Art. VIII & XIV. The latter provision allows for 
restrictions for a transitional period. There are still 19 IMF members which have authorized restrictions. 166 
members have accepted not to apply restrictions. A country which applies for WTO membership must relinquish 
all restrictions. IMF, Review of Exchange Arrangements, Restrictions, and Controls, November 27, 2007, p.  
38 Article XV:4 must be read in tandem with Article XV:9 containing a general exception. Former GATT 
Director of Legal Services Frieder Roessler also stated that Article XV:4 had to be read “in conjunction” with 
Article XV:9(a), noting that “Article XV therefore provides no protection against frustrating exchange action 
approved by the Fund or authorized under its Articles.” Frieder Roessler, Selective Balance-of-Payments 
Adjustment Measures Affecting Trade: The Roles of the GATT and the IMF, 9 J. WORLD TRADE L. 643 
(1975). 
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From this note we conclude the following. 
 
§ This note attempts to explain the meaning of ‘frustrate’ by providing examples. 
The example under the first indent mentions exchange actions; an example of a 
trade action that causes frustration of IMF provisions is not given. It is therefore 
important to underline that the note does not provide an exhaustive explanation 
or all the sorts of frustrations that exchange and trade actions may cause.  
 
§ The note explains that there are two requirements for a frustration: there must 
be an exchange action and a “frustrated intent of a provision”. Clearly, a 
“frustrated intent of a provision” is not equivalent to a “violated provision”. A 
provision may be violated, according to an ordinary meaning interpretation, but 
not frustrated as long as the intention (object and purpose) is upheld.  
 
§ It is also important that para. 4 and the note are applied in the context of Art. 
XV paragraph 1 and 2. Paragraph 2 clearly delineates the jurisdiction of the 
IMF vis-à-vis the WTO. According to the speciality principle each institution is 
supreme in its own field and intrusions must be avoided. This division of labour 
is also expressed in paragraph 1 of Article XV. Accordingly, the opinion of the 
IMF on any “action by a contracting party in exchange matters” or “exchange 
action” is decisive.39  
 
Now we have explained the meaning of ‘exchange action’ and ‘frustrate’ the core 
question therefore becomes: does manipulation amount to an ‘exchange action’ that 
‘frustrates’ the intent of GATT provisions? As with the IMF June 2007 Decision, 
‘manipulation of exchange rate’ has been given extensive explanations.40 Avoiding 
manipulation is a specific obligation of the members, as described in the Decision.  
 
Is manipulation an exchange action? 
Manipulation of the exchange rate involves policies that are directed at – and actually 
affect – the level of an exchange rate (movement or the prevention of movement of it). 
This behaviour may manifest itself in different ways, from excessive market 
intervention to imposition of capital controls. What is equally important is the purpose 
of adopting such behaviour, i.e. to gain an unfair competitive trading advantage. A 
member would only be considered to be manipulating exchange rates in order to gain 
an unfair competitive advantage over other members if the Fund determines both that: 
 
§ the member is engaged in these policies for the purposes of securing 
fundamental exchange rate misalignment in the form of an undervalued 
exchange rate, and  
§ the purpose of securing such misalignment is to increase net exports41 
                                                 
39 We hold that these expressions in paras. 2 and 4 of Article XV have the same meaning. 
40 Supra note 11. 
41 IMF, “Article IV of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement: An Overview of the Legal Framework”, prepared by 
the Legal Department in consultation with the Policy Development and Review Department, June 28, 2006; 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/062806.pdf  (visited 20 January, 2008) 
 13 
 
Manipulation of the exchange rate is an exchange rate policy, i.e. the behaviour 
adopted to put into operation the chosen exchange arrangement (here, pegging of the 
currency). Such policiy requires action from monetary authorities. This manipulation 
not only a breaches an IMF-obligation but also infringes GATT-obligations when the 
manipulation frustrates the intent of the provisions of GATT 1994.  
 
II.2. Legal Case II: the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement 
(SCM) 
 
By definition the manipulation of exchange rates have a profound impact on trade 
relations. It should be recalled that the IMF only brands a country a manipulator when 
the country attempts to ‘gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members’. 
 
The SCM Agreement prohibits two categories of subsidies - subsidies contingent upon 
exportation and upon the use of domestic over imported goods - that are specifically 
designed to affect trade. If a prohibited subsidy is determined, a WTO member may 
impose countervailing duties if it determines that the subsidy causes injury to the 
domestic industry.42  
 
Scholars have asserted that China’s manipulated exchange rate acts, in reality, as a 
prohibited export subsidy. Benitah43 explains that a subsidy may be challenged if three 
criteria are satisfied: the subsidy must be ‘specific’,44 it must entail a governmental 
‘financial contribution’45 and it must confer a benefit on its recipient. He subsequently 
                                                 
42 SCM Agreement Art. 19.1 
43 M. Benitah, ASIL Insights, October 2003, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh117.htm (February 2008)  
44 Benitah argues: “A program is deemed specific if it is granted selectively, in law or in fact, to an enterprise or 
group of enterprises. In other words, if it is available for all the sectors of the economy, it is not specific and 
therefore not an actionable subsidy. A first glance, it may appear that the Chinese fixed exchange rate is not 
targeted selectively toward a special sector of the Chinese economy, but on the contrary, is available for all 
sectors of the Chinese economy. Therefore it would not be specific and thus not actionable. 
      This first impression is misleading if we take into account the fact that the Chinese fixed exchange rate 
system would most likely be challenged as a prohibited de facto export subsidy, under Article 3 of the WTO 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement ("SCM Agreement"). Article 3 prohibits subsidies 
contingent, in law or in fact, on export performance. According to the WTO commentary to Article 3, this de 
facto standard is met when the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without having been made 
legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact tied to actual or anticipated exportation or export earnings. 
Article 2.3 of the SCM Agreement would then take effect. It stipulates that "Any subsidy falling under the 
provisions of Article 3 shall be deemed to be specific." 
      The specificity criterion thus does not seem to be an insurmountable legal obstacle to challenging the 
Chinese fixed exchange rate as a de facto export subsidy. In other words, if the United States demonstrates that 
the Chinese fixed exchange rate system is a de facto export subsidy, then automatically the specificity criterion 
would be satisfied.”. 
45 According to Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, there is a financial contribution when "a government provides 
goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods. The Panel on US - Softwood Lumber III 
described the concept of ‘financial contribution’ under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement: “Article 
1.1(a)(1) SCM Agreement provides that the first element of a subsidy is a 'financial contribution by the 
government'. Subparagraphs (i) through (iv) then explain that a financial contribution can exist in a wide variety 
of circumstances including, of course, the direct transfer of funds. But subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) show that a 
financial contribution will also exist if the government does not collect the revenue which it is entitled to or 
when it gives something or does something for an enterprise or purchases something from an enterprise or a 
group of enterprises.” 
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demonstrates that these criteria are met provided that there is ‘a convincing economic 
demonstration that the Yuan is grossly undervalued’.  
 
A requirement is to demonstrate whether the manipulated exchange rate provides a 
‘benefit’ to exporters. To determine a benefit two positions must be compared: a 
‘normal position’ and an ‘advantageous position’. Once the normal position is 
determined, it would be possible to recognize that there is an advantageous position 
and in fact a subsidy.46 In Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft the AB 
explained that the normal situation would be an open market: 
 
“[T]he ordinary meaning of 'benefit' clearly encompasses some form of advantage. ... In order to 
determine whether a financial contribution (in the sense of Article 1.1(a)(i)) confers a 'benefit', i.e., an 
advantage, it is necessary to determine whether the financial contribution places the recipient in a more 
advantageous position than would have been the case but for the financial contribution. In our view, the 
only logical basis for determining the position the recipient would have been in absent the financial 
contribution is the market. Accordingly, a financial contribution will only confer a 'benefit', i.e., an 
advantage, if it is provided on terms that are more advantageous than those that would have been 
available to the recipient on the market.” 
 
This finding surfaces inconsistent approaches of IMF and WTO towards market 
liberalisation. As countries operate in the common area of both monetary and trade 
relations, the WTO determines that an advantageous position created by non-market 
conditions may amount to an actionable subsidy. In contrast, these market forces are 
not prevalent in the International Monetary Fund. There is no prohibition to adopt a 
fixed exchange rate, nor is there an obligation to adopt exchange rates determined by 
market forces. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is no smoke without a fire. Within political circles the discussion over the 
undervalued yuan is a present and more or less flammable issue. It has been asserted 
that this should be a matter let to be solved through diplomatic means. 
Notwithstanding the efficiency of diplomacy, in case there will not be a viable result 
the legal apparatus is the next tool to consider. 
 
Great importance should be attached to the IMF’s June 2007 Decision on Bilateral 
Surveillance and even more on the new added principle four on ‘manipulation of 
exchange rates’ and its fairly extensive explanations. This decision shows that the 
matter is serious and one can speculate that IMF is ready now to point the finger to a 
‘manipulator’ i.e. China. If it does so, it could mean two things:  
 
§ That IMF could take action within its mandate inside the organization 
§ An affected WTO member would most likely feel encouraged to take the 
matter in the dispute settlement mechanism. Even if IMF does not point any 
finger a priori, any afflicted WTO member could bring the ‘manipulator’ in 
                                                 
46 In our argument the advantageous situation is caused by the currency manipulation. 
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front of a panel thanks to June Decision, which makes it clearer the kind of 
behaviour that a state should adopt (and thus is expected to have) vis-à-vis 
exchange rates.  
 
It is certainly not easy to asses ‘manipulation of exchange rates’ (as IMF itself 
recognizes); perhaps even more difficult is to asses how ‘manipulation’ affects trade 
and thus infringes the provisions of GATT. Certainly there would not be an easy task 
to build a case within WTO dispute settlement either on Article XV paragraph 4 or the 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM), as proposed. What became 
much easier is the understanding of what ‘manipulation of exchange rates’ is and this 
definitely should serve as an impetus for future legal action. 
 
Finally, we conclude that there are systemic inconsistencies between the IMF and the 
WTO. These inconsistencies lie at the root of the problem discussed above. The IMF 
allows members to adopt exchange rates policies (short of manipulation) that counter 
market forces. In contrast, the WTO aims at liberalising trade flows (by removing 
tariff and non-tariff barriers) whereby market forces prevail. We do not argue that all 
WTO members must adopt market-based exchange rates in spite of what the IMF 
Articles of Agreement stipulate. It would be unacceptable that the WTO determine 
exchange rate policies for countries, as this belongs to the exclusive domain of the 
IMF. We do believe, however, that IMF-WTO inconsistencies need to be addressed in 
order to promote fair competition. 
 
